seek board participation from a broad range of skills.

seek board participation from a broad range of skills.
There are a variety of reasons why we should expect these di_erences to alter
the structure of CEO compensation in cooperative _rms,relative to what is
observed under other ownership models.On the one hand,access to better information
and heightened incentives for monitoring might lead to more detailed
contracts and reliance on a richer set of performance indicators.On the other
hand,the close proximity of board members to management,and a relative lack
of expertise on key management decisions,might lead to greater reliance on
subjective performance evaluation and more managerial autonomy.Similarly,
because there typically is heterogeneity across owners in how they value their
transactional relationship with the _rm,it may be di_cult to achieve consensus
on the Board regarding speci_c performance targets.This too may lead
to "looser" contracts that allow the manager to accommodate a diverse set of
interests.
The purpose of this paper is to _esh these (and other) hypotheses out more
fully,and then to provide tentative evidence on the actual structure of CEO
compensation in cooperatives with a series of case interviews.On a variety
of dimensions,cooperative governance provides a contrast that can be used
as an experimental "treatment" to test theory and inform debate about the
fundamental forces a_ecting CEO compensation.Toward this end,we aim to
place our work in the broader context of research on CEO compensation across
all organizational forms.The relevant literature is vast,so we will focus on the
narrower question of how executive performance is (or is not) measured and
rewarded.